Investigation into the Insolvency, Regulatory Liquidation, and Asset Recovery Pathways for Next Bank International, Inc.

Executive Summary and Critical Entity Disambiguation

The collapse of a financial institution necessitates a forensic examination of its corporate lineage, regulatory environment, and the precise legal mechanisms governing its dissolution. This report provides an exhaustive investigation into the insolvency of Next Bank International, Inc., an International Financial Entity (IFE) formerly operating under the jurisdiction of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. The primary objective of this analysis is to reconstruct the systemic and localized events leading to the institution’s failure, to profile the key actors managing its liquidation, and to outline strategic, actionable legal avenues for the recovery of lost deposits and institutional funds.

A critical preliminary step in this investigation is the absolute disambiguation of the target entity. Archival financial data and public search records frequently conflate two distinct banking institutions that share a similar nomenclature. This conflation poses a significant risk of misdirected legal effort, wasted capital, and flawed strategic assumptions regarding depositor insurance. The failure to distinguish between these entities will fundamentally compromise any asset recovery strategy.

The first entity, which must be systematically excluded from the current recovery framework, is NextBank, National Association (N.A.). This institution was a pioneering internet-only credit card bank based in Phoenix, Arizona. It failed more than two decades ago, on February 7, 2002, holding total assets of approximately $700 million. The institution was formally closed by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) was appointed as the statutory receiver. The 2002 failure of NextBank, N.A., and its subsequent resolution became a textbook example analyzed by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) regarding how the failure of a relatively simple bank can lead to complex legal questions that take years to resolve outside of the standard bankruptcy context. During its receivership, the FDIC was forced to advise the Bank of New York, acting as Trustee for the NextCard Credit Card Master Trust, regarding the unenforceability of automatic acceleration events based solely on the appointment of the FDIC as receiver, specifically under established FDIC policy codified by express rule at 12 CFR 360.6. The FDIC has long since concluded the business affairs of this Arizona-based institution, made all dividend distributions to approved creditors as required by law, and the receivership is deemed permanently terminated. The FDIC process, including its Claims Agent infrastructure accessible via the historical 1-877-367-2719 number and its Electronic Deposit Insurance Estimator (EDIE), is entirely irrelevant to the current crisis.

The second, and correct, target of this investigation is Next Bank International, Inc., a Puerto Rico-domiciled corporation operating under an Act 273-2012 license as an International Financial Entity. This institution is not a U.S. National Bank and, crucially, it is not FDIC-insured. Instead, it was regulated exclusively by the Puerto Rico Office of the Commissioner of Financial Institutions, known locally as the Oficina del Comisionado de Instituciones Financieras (OCIF). Next Bank International is currently undergoing a mandatory liquidation and dissolution process under OCIF Case Number C-24-EFI-01, having been stripped of its operating capabilities.

The following structural comparison isolates the operational, legal, and jurisdictional boundaries of the two entities to ensure absolute precision in the subsequent formulation of recovery strategies.

The failure of Next Bank International in Puerto Rico cannot be viewed in a vacuum. It is not merely the result of localized mismanagement, but rather the consequence of a catastrophic convergence of parent-company insolvency, severe undercapitalization, high-risk related-party transactions, and a sweeping, unprecedented regulatory crackdown by Puerto Rican authorities aimed at cleansing the jurisdiction of non-compliant international banks. The recovery of institutional funds demands an understanding of this broader ecosystem.

The Macro-Regulatory Environment: Puerto Rico’s IFE Crackdown

To fully comprehend the mechanisms that forced Next Bank International into liquidation, it is necessary to examine the evolving regulatory ecosystem in which it operated. For years, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico actively marketed itself as a premier offshore financial center tailored for the modern digital economy. By leveraging the International Financial Center Regulatory Act of Puerto Rico, commonly known as Act 273-2012, the jurisdiction offered highly favorable tax incentives for entities providing banking services to clients located strictly outside of Puerto Rico. This legislative framework attracted numerous financial technology startups, crypto-adjacent banking platforms, and institutional actors seeking a unique blend of a U.S.-adjacent regulatory environment coupled with the traditional benefits of an offshore tax haven.

However, the rapid expansion of the IFE sector was accompanied by systemic vulnerabilities. Widespread regulatory abuse, inadequate anti-money laundering (AML) controls, insufficient customer due diligence (CDD), weak protocols for combating the financing of terrorism (CTF), and chronic undercapitalization within the sector prompted a severe regulatory correction. The Office of the Commissioner of Financial Institutions (OCIF), operating under the aggressive leadership of Commissioner Natalia Zequeira Díaz, initiated a systemic, unyielding purge of non-compliant international banks operating within the territory. This regulatory crackdown represents a fundamental paradigm shift in how Puerto Rico governs its financial sector, transforming it from a permissive offshore haven to an aggressively monitored regulatory environment.

The regulatory tightening culminated in significant legislative amendments to the Puerto Rico international banking law, which took effect on February 16, 2024, with subsequent, more stringent regulatory guidance issued progressively throughout 2025. These structural reforms were explicitly designed to professionalize the international banking sector, stabilize volatile institutions, and mitigate systemic reputational risk to the Commonwealth. The new regulatory framework imposed draconian measures on existing institutions. Key provisions included raising the mandatory minimum paid-in capital requirement from a relatively accessible $5 million to a prohibitive $10 million. Furthermore, the regulations mandated the appointment of at least one independent director to the board of every IFE, demanded robust and verifiable compliance staffing, mandated the use of Puerto Rican or U.S.-based holding companies, and imposed significantly higher regulatory fees alongside punitive fines for compliance failures. Crucially, the new regulations stipulated that all share transfers, regardless of the percentage of ownership involved, now required explicit, prior approval from OCIF, stripping parent companies of their ability to quietly restructure failing banks.

Next Bank International was caught squarely in this regulatory dragnet. It joined a rapidly expanding list of international financial institutions that were either forcibly liquidated, heavily sanctioned, or placed under permanent receivership by OCIF. A forensic review of precedent cases within the jurisdiction provides critical insight into the severity of the regulatory climate and the methodologies employed by the Commissioner:

The liquidation of Next Bank International marks the continuation of a relentless trend, representing at least the twenty-third intervention or full liquidation of an international financial institution in Puerto Rico over a highly condensed three-year span. The underlying regulatory message is unequivocal: OCIF no longer tolerates institutions that fail to maintain pristine balance sheets, strict Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) compliance, and the newly mandated $10 million capital threshold. The failure of Next Bank International was not merely a localized business failure; it was an inevitability driven by its intrinsic inability to survive this aggressive regulatory maturation while simultaneously anchored to a failing corporate parent.

Corporate Genesis and the NextPlay Technologies Acquisition

To identify the liable parties and trace the dissipation of deposited funds, the forensic history of Next Bank International must be mapped. The corporate lineage reveals a highly convoluted organizational structure characterized by constant strategic pivots, highly leveraged acquisitions, and fundamental financial instability. The banking entity was originally incorporated in 2017 under the laws of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, initially operating under the name International Financial Enterprise Bank, Inc. (IFEB). The institution received its official international financial entity license, designated as License #51, on June 18, 2017, placing it under the direct regulatory purview of OCIF.

The critical operational turning point, and the genesis of the institution’s ultimate failure, occurred in the first half of 2021 when the bank was targeted for acquisition by NextPlay Technologies, Inc., a publicly traded entity listed on the NASDAQ under the ticker symbol NXTP. NextPlay Technologies was not a traditional financial holding company equipped with the conservative risk management protocols required to operate an offshore bank. Rather, it was a speculative, multi-industry conglomerate attempting to merge disparate and highly volatile sectors—including advertising technology (AdTech), video game development, travel booking, and digital banking—into a single, unified “worldwide digital ecosystem”. The parent company’s operational divisions included the NextMedia Division, which housed HotPlay Enterprise Limited (an in-game advertising platform designed to deliver promotional coupons without disrupting gameplay); Extraordinary Vacations USA, Inc. (a travel booking entity); and eventually, the NextFinTech Division, which was designed to house the acquired banking asset and offer mobile banking, alternative asset investments, and insurance.

The acquisition of IFEB by NextPlay Technologies was a highly leveraged, multi-stage transaction that immediately stressed the parent company’s balance sheet. On March 22, 2021, NextPlay entered into a Bill of Sale with certain third-party initial sellers to purchase 2,191,489 shares of IFEB’s authorized and outstanding Class A Common Stock, representing approximately 57.06% of the institution. The purchase price for this controlling stake was $6,400,000 in cash, which was officially remitted on April 1, 2021. Subsequently, on July 21, 2021, NextPlay executed a Share Exchange Agreement to acquire the remaining 42.9% of the bank from additional sellers. This second tranche was not purchased with cash, but rather through the issuance of 1,926,750 shares of NextPlay’s restricted common stock, structurally valued at an equivalent of $2.50 per share, totaling approximately $4.8 million.

Following the successful acquisition of 100% of the equity and the receipt of mandatory regulatory approval from OCIF in June 2021, the parent company rebranded the institution as Next Bank International. The strategic rationale aggressively marketed to shareholders and prospective depositors was that Next Bank International would serve as the financial engine for the broader conglomerate, providing “concierge banking, online and mobile banking, and crypto-banking services” to support NextPlay’s video game and digital media platforms. However, the integration of a heavily regulated offshore bank, subject to strict capital adequacy guidelines, into a volatile, cash-burning technology holding company created an untenable and catastrophic risk profile.

Financial Entanglement, Mismanagement, and the Liquidity Crisis

An exhaustive analysis of NextPlay Technologies’ filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) reveals deep structural flaws, questionable financial practices, and systemic self-dealing that ultimately compromised the liquidity and solvency of Next Bank International, leaving depositor funds highly vulnerable.

From the outset of the acquisition, the parent company acknowledged in its required disclosures that it operated under severe financial duress. The company openly cited significant indebtedness, stated that amounts owed by third parties might not be paid timely, and admitted that the economic shocks of the COVID-19 pandemic severely impacted its travel division. Furthermore, the company explicitly warned investors that its need for additional capital raised profound questions about its fundamental ability to continue as a going concern. Despite these warnings, the conglomerate utilized the banking subsidiary in ways that strained its capital adequacy. Next Bank International was subject to various regulatory capital requirements, and under capital adequacy guidelines, it was required to meet specific quantitative measures of its assets, liabilities, and off-balance sheet items.

More alarmingly, the public filings expose a distinct pattern of related-party transactions and structural entanglements that likely drained high-quality capital from the subsidiary bank. For example, as of early 2022, Next Bank International held a $705,000 loan on its books. This specific loan had been purchased in 2020 at a discounted purchase price of $647,776, prior to NextPlay’s full acquisition. However, the borrower on this loan was an entity directly affiliated with a current member of the bank’s own Board of Directors. The loan carried an annual interest rate of 10%, and by February 28, 2022, the outstanding balance on this insider loan had grown to $725,000. The existence of high-yield loans tied to board members indicates a highly permissive internal lending culture that prioritizes insider liquidity over depositor security.

The broader NextPlay ecosystem was characterized by relentless cash-flow desperation, heavily reliant on complex short-term borrowing from affiliated offshore entities. SEC disclosures reveal that on March 24, 2021, the company entered into a short-term, unsecured loan payable on demand with Magnolia Quality Development Corporation Limited for $480,000 (15,000,000 Thai Baht) at a 9% annual interest rate. Similarly, the company held another short-term, unsecured, on-demand loan with Tree Roots Entertainment Group Company Limited (TREG) for $543,000 (17,000,000 Thai Baht) at an accrued interest rate of 9.7% per annum, of which only a portion was repaid. Furthermore, the company was executing inter-company asset purchases, such as HotPlay Thailand purchasing assets and software from a related party, HotNow, for 19,500,000 Thai Baht (approximately $624,000 USD) in early 2021.

Despite this fragile financial state, the parent company’s Board of Directors authorized massive, discretionary capital outflows to executives. For instance, the board approved a discretionary bonus for executive William Kerby for fiscal year 2021 in the amount of $400,000, payable in cash or shares of common stock at a conversion price of $3.02 per share.

To support its flagging operations and attempt to maintain liquidity, Next Bank International entered into a highly restrictive Loan and Security Agreement with Savi Capital Partners LLC, a Delaware limited liability company, on May 31, 2022. Under the terms of this agreement, the bank effectively pledged assets, and the lender maintained strict control over a designated Cash Collateral Account. The agreement legally stipulated that Savi Capital Partners would only release the funds held in the Cash Collateral Account on the earlier of the date the lender received payment in full of all obligations, or twelve months following the closing date, provided no event of default had occurred. This arrangement further encumbered the bank’s liquid reserves, locking away capital that should have been available to service depositor withdrawals. The agreement also contained strict covenants regarding the allocation of “Interest Proceeds,” defined as all payments, late fees, modification fees, and recoveries on Mortgage Loans, routing them through specific channels rather than general operating funds.

This toxic combination of related-party insider lending, heavily encumbered collateral accounts, massive executive compensation payouts, and a parent company bleeding capital to service high-interest Thai Baht loans created an insurmountable liquidity crisis. When OCIF enacted its stringent 2024 regulatory amendments—explicitly requiring a $10 million paid-in capital threshold for all IFEs—Next Bank International, burdened by its parent’s insolvency and its own encumbered balance sheet, was mathematically incapable of achieving compliance.

Forensic Profile of Key Corporate Architects: John Todd Bonner and Nithinan Boonyawattanapisut

The ongoing investigation into the dissipation of Next Bank International’s assets must heavily scrutinize the principal architects behind its parent company, NextPlay Technologies. While public commentary has occasionally conflated titles, corporate filings confirm that John Todd Bonner served as the Chairman of the Board for the parent entity, NextPlay Technologies , rather than the direct CEO of the bank. His spouse, Nithinan “Jess” Boonyawattanapisut, served alongside him as the Co-Chief Executive Officer of NextPlay. Together, they held a substantial equity stake in the conglomerate, both directly and through affiliated holding entities such as Red Anchor Trading Corporation.

Crucially, the collapse of Next Bank International is not the first instance of severe corporate distress linked to these individuals. Bonner and Boonyawattanapisut have a documented history of complex, multi-jurisdictional corporate litigation involving allegations of asset misappropriation. In January 2021, Axion Ventures Inc.—a company where Bonner formerly served as CEO—filed a civil claim in the Supreme Court of British Columbia against the couple. The lawsuit explicitly alleged breach of fiduciary duty, conspiracy, fraud, and the unlawful transfer (often termed the “HotPlay Theft”) of Axion’s intellectual property to HotPlay (Thailand) Ltd., an entity that was subsequently folded into the NextPlay corporate structure.

Furthermore, their ventures have attracted aggressive international legal scrutiny. Certain Japanese investors have filed active civil claims (formally tracked as the “Yamanaka Claim” and the “Hirakawa Claim”) against Bonner and Boonyawattanapisut regarding disputed shares. While ongoing intelligence-gathering efforts seek to pinpoint Bonner’s exact current location, his historical business ties to Japan are well-documented, having served as CEO of Pacific Century CyberWorks Japan from 2001 to 2003. The couple is also deeply embedded in the heavily scrutinized digital asset sector through Longroot, Inc., an Initial Coin Offering (ICO) portal explicitly regulated by the Thai Securities and Exchange Commission.

For an institutional depositor seeking asset recovery, understanding the modus operandi of Bonner and Boonyawattanapisut is critical. The allegations in the Axion Ventures litigation—specifically the unauthorized shifting of corporate assets to affiliated entities—mirror the structural vulnerabilities and related-party transactions that ultimately drained Next Bank International. Consequently, any legal strategy pursuing parent-company liability or Directors and Officers (D&O) insurance payouts must aggressively target the decision-making and asset-transfer history of these two executives.

The Dual Collapse: Chapter 7 Bankruptcy and OCIF Liquidation

The ultimate collapse of Next Bank International is inextricably tied to the financial death spiral of its parent holding company, NextPlay Technologies. Throughout 2023 and 2024, NextPlay’s operational metrics deteriorated rapidly, and its stock price plummeted, triggering a cascade of non-compliance and delisting notices from the NASDAQ stock exchange. Between late 2023 and early 2024, trading of the stock was frequently halted, and the company issued numerous press releases acknowledging its failure to meet minimum listing requirements. In a seemingly desperate attempt to project solvency, the company announced the execution of a highly questionable $2 billion financing agreement on January 23, 2024. However, this announcement failed to stabilize the entity, and the institutional market completely lost faith in the management’s ability to execute a turnaround.

The terminal event for the parent company occurred one year later, on January 27, 2025. A coalition of petitioning creditors—specifically identified in court filings as Ian Sharpe, William Kerby (notably, the same executive who previously received the $400,000 discretionary bonus), and Don Monaco—filed an Involuntary Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Petition against NextPlay Technologies, Inc.. The petition was filed in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida (Fort Lauderdale division) under Case Number 0:25-bk-10838, and assigned to Judge Scott M. Grossman. The creditors were represented by attorney Brandon C. Meadows.

The filing of an involuntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition by creditors, including a former highly-compensated executive, is an exceedingly aggressive legal maneuver. It signifies a complete breakdown of corporate governance and a total loss of faith in the executive team. Unlike a Chapter 11 reorganization, where management remains in place to restructure debt, an involuntary Chapter 7 proceeding forcefully strips control of the company from its executives. A federal bankruptcy trustee is immediately appointed to assume absolute control, identify all remaining corporate assets, and liquidate them to pay off creditors in accordance with the statutory hierarchy.

Simultaneously, or shortly thereafter, the regulatory authorities in Puerto Rico intervened with definitive force. OCIF, recognizing that a highly regulated International Financial Entity cannot legally or practically operate when its ultimate parent holding company is undergoing a hostile Chapter 7 liquidation in federal court, took immediate action. Furthermore, noting the inevitable breaches of the newly enacted $10 million capitalization requirements and the likely deterioration of AML/BSA compliance mechanisms, OCIF issued a formal Order for Liquidation and Dissolution of International Financial Entity against Next Bank International, Inc..

The OCIF Order, tracked under case number C-24-EFI-01, was a sweeping administrative action. The publicly filed document explicitly stated its multi-pronged purpose: (i) to attend to an imminent danger to the security of the IFE industry operating from the jurisdiction of Puerto Rico; (ii) to protect the public interest by guaranteeing total and strict compliance with all applicable laws and regulations governing licenses issued by OCIF; and (iii) to definitively prevent irreparable harm to the interests of Next Bank, its creditors, and the persons and entities holding funds or securities within the institution. By executing this order, stripping the bank of its operating license, and initiating a mandatory liquidation, OCIF effectively severed Next Bank International from the dying, bankrupt NextPlay Technologies ecosystem. This regulatory ring-fencing was designed to isolate whatever localized assets remained within the Puerto Rican entity and place them under the strict, independent control of a state-appointed receiver.

Profile and Modus Operandi of the Appointed Receiver

Upon issuing the liquidation order, OCIF formally appointed Wigberto Lugo Mender, Esq., CPA, to act as the Liquidating Receiver and Trustee. The mandate granted to the Trustee is absolute: to take possession and physical control of all assets and liabilities of Next Bank International, supervise the dissolution, and execute the liquidation process in an orderly manner. Understanding the methodology, professional background, and historical operational tactics of the appointed Trustee is of paramount importance for any institutional creditor seeking to recover funds, as the Trustee possesses sweeping discretionary power over the adjudication of claims and the distribution of the estate’s remaining capital.

Wigberto Lugo Mender operates through his eponymous firm, Lugo Mender Group LLC, a boutique integrated service firm specializing in commercial financial consulting, insolvency, bankruptcy, and litigation support, headquartered in the Guaynabo area of Puerto Rico. He is uniquely and powerfully positioned within the Puerto Rican insolvency ecosystem, possessing dual professional qualifications as both a licensed attorney and a Certified Public Accountant. Furthermore, he serves as a standing member of the Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Trustee Panel for the District of Puerto Rico, granting him deep structural ties to the federal bankruptcy courts. His firm advertises over 20 years of specialized experience dealing with estate administration, business reorganization, and complex litigation support across various industries.

Because the Next Bank International liquidation is currently in progress, direct data regarding the final asset pool is limited. However, Lugo Mender is concurrently serving as the OCIF-appointed liquidator for several other high-profile failed institutions within the jurisdiction, most notably Euro Pacific International Bank (EPIB) and First Finance International Bank. A forensic analysis of his conduct, filings, and public reports in these parallel liquidations provides a highly predictive blueprint for how the Next Bank International dissolution will be managed, highlighting specific risks and strategic realities for depositors.

First, creditors must understand the impact of administrative costs on the recovery pool. In his capacity as Receiver, Lugo Mender utilizes his own firm’s internal resources—accountants, financial consultants, and legal advisers—and bills the insolvent estate accordingly, as permitted by OCIF regulations. An examination of the Euro Pacific Bank liquidation report for the second quarter of 2025 illustrates this financial dynamic. During the reporting period (April 1 to June 30, 2025), the estate generated $226,534 in interest income from funds held in custody. Against this income, the Trustee billed $40,454 in net fees for his own services, alongside an additional $17,531 in other professional fees, withholding taxes, and computer/internet expenses, resulting in total disbursements of $57,985 for a single quarter. Creditors of Next Bank International must operate under the assumption that the administrative costs of the ongoing liquidation will continually erode the recoverable asset pool month over month.

Second, Lugo Mender has demonstrated a highly aggressive, litigious approach toward third parties and corporate insiders whom he believes have misappropriated bank assets or caused harm to the estate. In the Euro Pacific case, he did not simply passively liquidate assets; he initiated massive federal litigation. He filed a Verified Complaint (Civil No. 25-1501) in the United States District Court against the bank’s sole shareholder, Peter Schiff, and a third-party entity, Qenta, Inc., alleging severe federal violations, including breaches of the Commodity Exchange Act and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). The Trustee explicitly accused the defendants of orchestrating a calculated scheme and a “campaign of coordinated deception” to misappropriate nearly $50 million in customer assets disguised as a legitimate Purchase and Assumption Agreement. He aggressively sought provisional remedies and temporary restraining orders to freeze assets. This behavioral profile indicates that if Lugo Mender’s forensic accountants discover that NextPlay Technologies, its executives, or entities tied to the $705,000 insider loan illegally drained capital from Next Bank International, he is highly likely to initiate aggressive cross-border litigation against the Chapter 7 estate in Florida to claw back those funds.

Third, Lugo Mender adheres to strict, formalized procedural compliance regarding public notices, document submissions, and the claims review process. In his liquidations, he routinely establishes dedicated, case-specific website portals (e.g., nextbankprliquidation.com, epbprliquidation.com, firstfinanceprliquidation.com) to centralize all communications, effectively forcing all creditors to interact strictly through formal, documented channels rather than informal inquiries. He requires precise documentation from claimants, demanding secure email submissions containing specific account numbers, legal corporate names, and verifiable proof of deposits.

Chronology of the Next Bank International Liquidation

The liquidation of Next Bank International has progressed systematically through the first half of 2025. The Trustee’s publication of sequential invoices, statutory legal notices, and quarterly reports provides a clear timeline of administrative actions. This timeline is critical for determining the current legal status of depositor claims.

The issuance of the “Third and Final Notice of Bank Liquidation,” originally dated May 27, 2025, and published on May 29, 2025, represents the most critical legal inflection point in the entire process. In typical Puerto Rican insolvency proceedings governed by OCIF, the publication of the final notice establishes the absolute deadline (commonly referred to as the “bar date”) for all creditors, including institutional depositors, to formally submit their proofs of claim to the Trustee. Failure to correctly file a comprehensive claim before this deadline generally results in the permanent forfeiture of the right to participate in any fractional dividend distributions from the liquidated estate.

Exhaustive Strategic Avenues for Asset Recovery

Given the complex, multi-jurisdictional nature of this failure—involving a localized Puerto Rican regulatory liquidation administered by a highly aggressive Trustee, intertwined with a federal Chapter 7 bankruptcy of the parent holding company in Florida—institutional depositors seeking to recover lost capital must adopt a multi-pronged legal, forensic, and administrative strategy. Relying on a single point of failure is inadvisable. The following options represent the exhaustive, viable pathways for asset recovery, arranged by jurisdictional mechanism.

Option A: Direct Claim in the OCIF Liquidation Estate (The Primary Statutory Pathway)

The most direct and statutorily defined route for a depositor to recover funds is to successfully participate as a recognized, validated creditor in the ongoing OCIF liquidation administered by Wigberto Lugo Mender. When an International Financial Entity is liquidated under Puerto Rican law, the Receiver’s mandate is to aggregate all cash accounts, liquidate all non-cash assets (such as outstanding loan portfolios, including the $705,000 insider loan), and distribute the resulting funds in accordance with a strict legal hierarchy. Because IFEs are entirely uninsured offshore entities, standard depositors are classified as unsecured creditors. They will only receive a pro-rata distribution (a fractional “dividend”) if capital remains after the Trustee’s administrative fees, legal costs, OCIF regulatory fines, and secured creditors are fully satisfied. It is highly pertinent that Savi Capital Partners LLC holds a Loan and Security Agreement with the bank; if their security interest in the Cash Collateral Account is deemed valid by the Trustee, they will be paid out before any depositor receives a single dollar.

To execute this primary strategy, the depositor must immediately establish a formal Proof of Claim. The depositor’s legal counsel must compile exhaustive documentation proving the exact existence, origin, and quantum of the deposited funds. While the specific email address for Next Bank International claims is not explicitly advertised on the main landing page, the Trustee’s strict protocol in parallel cases (such as Euro Pacific Bank) requires submitting document packages containing the account number, legal corporate name, and transfer records to a designated secure email address, often managed by a third-party professional services firm (e.g., pr******************@****fs.com) or a dedicated trustee address (e.g., tr*****@**************on.com). For Next Bank International, the initial contact must be routed through the specific “Request Information” module located on the liquidation portal, nextbankprliquidation.com, which directs users to the appropriate intake channels managed by the Lugo Mender Group.

The critical obstacle to this pathway is the May 2025 Bar Date. Because the Third and Final Notice of Bank Liquidation was published in late May 2025, the standard window for claims submission has likely closed. Therefore, if the CEO/depositor has not yet filed a formal claim, specialized Puerto Rican insolvency counsel must be retained immediately to file a highly technical “late claim” motion with the Receiver and the overseeing court. The counsel must forcefully argue principles of excusable neglect, or mathematically demonstrate that the Trustee failed to provide direct, individualized written notice to the depositor as required by internal OCIF liquidation protocols, relying solely on digital publication, which may be deemed insufficient for large institutional stakeholders.

Option B: Alter Ego Litigation and Intervention in the Florida Chapter 7 Estate

If the Next Bank International estate in Puerto Rico is entirely depleted—meaning the Trustee’s administrative fees, the Savi Capital secured loan, and regulatory fines absorb 100% of the liquid assets—the depositor will receive a zero-dollar dividend from the PR liquidation. In this scenario, the recovery strategy must radically pivot away from the subsidiary and target the ultimate parent company, NextPlay Technologies, Inc.

NextPlay is currently undergoing involuntary Chapter 7 liquidation in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida (Case 0:25-bk-10838). In standard corporate law, a depositor in a subsidiary bank generally has no direct legal claim against the parent holding company due to the principle of limited liability. However, this liability shield can be destroyed. If forensic accounting reveals that NextPlay Technologies treated Next Bank International not as an independent, capitalized financial institution, but as a mere “alter ego” or a piggy bank for corporate expenses, the corporate veil can be pierced. The SEC filings provide significant ammunition for this legal theory: the existence of the $705,000 insider loan to an entity affiliated with a board member, the complex short-term high-interest loans from Thai entities, and the rapid shifting of millions of dollars between the AdTech, Travel, and FinTech divisions all point to severe financial commingling.

To execute this aggressive strategy, the depositor’s federal bankruptcy counsel would file a proof of claim directly in the Florida bankruptcy court, arguing that NextPlay is directly, legally liable for the loss of the deposits due to fraudulent conveyance, systemic breach of fiduciary duty, and the commingling of subsidiary assets. Furthermore, the depositor should strategically seek to collaborate with the PR Trustee, Wigberto Lugo Mender. Lugo Mender is highly incentivized to recover capital to increase the size of the PR estate (from which his fees are drawn). As demonstrated by his $50 million lawsuit against Peter Schiff in the Euro Pacific case, Lugo Mender will not hesitate to pursue parent company executives. The depositor’s legal team could form an ad-hoc creditor committee and offer to partially fund or technically support adversary proceedings initiated by Lugo Mender against the NextPlay Chapter 7 estate in Florida, utilizing the Trustee’s statutory power to force the return of stripped capital.

Option C: Pursuing Directors and Officers (D&O) Liability Insurance

When complex corporate entities enter Chapter 7 bankruptcy, their actual cash assets on hand are frequently negligible, having been burned through during the company’s decline. Therefore, suing the bankrupt entity itself often yields pennies on the dollar. However, the individual directors and corporate officers who oversaw the collapse are virtually always covered by comprehensive Directors and Officers (D&O) liability insurance policies.

The executives of NextPlay Technologies (including those targeted by the involuntary bankruptcy petition, such as William Kerby) and the Board of Directors of Next Bank International oversaw operations that resulted in severe regulatory infractions, explicit non-compliance with the OCIF $10 million IFE capital mandate, and ultimate, catastrophic insolvency. Furthermore, they executed questionable insider lending transactions and authorized massive executive bonuses while the company was in a distressed, fundamentally insolvent state.

Depositors who have suffered massive financial losses can initiate direct civil litigation in federal or territorial courts against the individual directors and officers of NextPlay Technologies and Next Bank International. The causes of action would include gross negligence, breach of fiduciary duty to depositors, and potentially civil fraud. The strategic goal of this litigation is not necessarily to seize the personal assets of the executives—which are likely shielded in trusts or offshore accounts—but to legally trigger the payout clauses of the corporate D&O insurance policies. These specialized policies are underwritten by major insurers and often hold millions of dollars in coverage specifically designed to indemnify executives against lawsuits stemming from corporate mismanagement. A well-crafted lawsuit can force a settlement paid directly from the insurance carrier to the aggrieved depositor, bypassing the depleted bankruptcy estates entirely.

Option D: The Long-Tail Pathway of Puerto Rican Unclaimed Funds

The final avenue for recovery acts as a defensive, long-tail failsafe. If a depositor successfully registers a claim with the Receiver, but subsequently fails to monitor the multi-year process, or if the Trustee eventually issues a physical distribution check that is mailed to an old address and never cashed, those funds are not immediately forfeited to the state. The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico maintains a robust, highly structured legal framework governing abandoned property and unclaimed funds, specifically codified under Act No. 36 of July 28, 1989 (the Abandoned or Unclaimed Money Act) and Act No. 55 of May 12, 1933 (the Banking Act).

Under Title 26, Section 4042 of the Puerto Rican code, any unclaimed funds that are subject to distribution, but remain in the physical possession of the liquidator after the final payout cycle, cannot simply be absorbed by the Trustee. They must be legally deposited into a specific unclaimed fund account maintained under the strict custody of the OCIF Commissioner.

The law dictates a specific temporal window for recovery: if the rightful owner of the deposit presents satisfactory proof of ownership to the Commissioner within two years immediately following the final liquidation distribution, the Commissioner is legally obligated to remit the funds to the claimant. However, if the funds remain unclaimed for the duration of that two-year post-liquidation period, the Commissioner is empowered to file a formal motion with the Receivership Court to declare the funds officially and permanently abandoned. At that juncture, the court will rule that the claim has been abandoned, and the funds will be swept into the Puerto Rico General Fund, transferred to the Secretary of the Treasury, or utilized by OCIF to pay general liquidation administrative expenses for other insolvent entities that lack sufficient operational capital.

Even after funds are transferred to the General Fund, claimants maintain a pathway to petition the Unclaimed Funds Division of OCIF, currently directed by Salva Valentin (Unclaimed Property Supervisor), to recover the money. This administrative process is highly advantageous for long-tail recovery as it is explicitly free of charge, requires no third-party brokers, and involves submitting documentation directly to **@*****pr.gov or via the encrypted OCIF online portal. The Unclaimed Funds Division maintains specific dormancy periods for different asset classes, and requires electronic report uploads to maximize the chances of reuniting funds with rightful owners. However, this option is inherently contingent; it is only viable if the Next Bank International liquidation actually yields a positive distribution dividend that the depositor subsequently misses. If the dividend is zero, no funds will ever reach the OCIF registry.

Strategic Conclusion

The insolvency of Next Bank International is not an isolated, unpredictable anomaly. It is the highly predictable consequence of a poorly capitalized, cash-burning technology holding company attempting to operate a stringently regulated offshore financial entity during a period of intense, unprecedented regulatory scrutiny by the Puerto Rican government. The parent company, NextPlay Technologies, cannibalized its own liquidity, engaged in questionable related-party transactions, and ultimately triggered an involuntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy in federal court. Simultaneously, the Puerto Rican regulatory body, strictly enforcing new $10 million capitalization thresholds designed to purge the sector, stepped in to liquidate the subsidiary bank to protect the broader jurisdictional ecosystem.

For a principal stakeholder who has suffered a total loss of corporate funds trapped within the Next Bank International entity, the situation is severe, but it is not entirely without legal recourse. The assertion that “they never returned those funds” accurately reflects the harsh reality of an uninsured, unsecured creditor trapped in a frozen offshore regulatory liquidation. There is no FDIC safety net to automatically remit a check, and the appointed Trustee is actively billing the estate for hundreds of thousands of dollars in administrative fees. Recovery requires aggressive, immediate, and proactive legal intervention across multiple jurisdictions.

The immediate operational priority must be the retention of specialized, dual-qualified legal counsel—specifically, experts in both Puerto Rican administrative banking law (to effectively interface with OCIF and the aggressive Trustee) and U.S. federal bankruptcy law (to aggressively monitor and intervene in the Florida Chapter 7 proceedings).

Counsel must immediately contact the Receiver, Wigberto Lugo Mender, via his established secure portals, formally assert the existence of the deposit, and immediately file a motion for a late proof of claim to bypass the May 2025 bar date. Simultaneously, counsel must demand a full accounting from the Receiver regarding the estate’s solvency. If the PR estate is functionally insolvent, the legal strategy must shift geographically to the Southern District of Florida, pursuing alter-ego claims against the NextPlay Technologies Chapter 7 estate and initiating civil litigation to trigger the millions of dollars locked within the corporate Directors and Officers liability insurance policies. The recovery of these funds will be a protracted, highly adversarial, and multi-jurisdictional process, requiring a sustained legal offensive against the remnants of the failed corporate structure.

Call for Information: This publication is continuing its investigation into the collapse of Next Bank International and the potential liability of its senior management, including John Todd Bonner and Nithinan Boonyawattanapisut. If you or anyone you know has any information regarding the situation, their current business activities, or the movement of NextPlay assets, please write in the comments below or write us on the contact form here.